Successfully Managing Fishing Capacity What options are available?

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Overview

- Symptoms and drivers of overcapacity
- Approaches to addressing overcapacity
- Shifts to successful management regimes
- □ Forging a common vision

Reminders

Reminder #1

- Overall purpose:
 - sustainability, stock diversity, social benefits from ecosystems

- Commercial perspective:
 - trying to ensure profitability

- Operational perspective:
 - encouraging involvement in management arrangements

Reminder #2

- Purpose of capacity management:
 - prevent the development of overcapacity

or

bring the existing capacity into line with the predefined target level of capacity

Overcapacity: Symptoms & Drivers



Symptoms

- Depletion, overexploitation
- Overinvestment, idle boats
- Conflicts, increasing political strife
- Pressure to raise TACs
- Financial concerns
- Declines in safety and quality of life
- Overcapacity in processing sector
- Cyclical not steady employment
- Economic losses, reduced returns to capital, labor



Drivers of Overcapacity

- People wanting to eat
- People wanting to have money
- Companies wanting product
- Companies wanting profits
- Countries wanting domestic & export revenues

Regulations making it harder to fish



Drivers of Overcapacity

- Overcapacity in fisheries develops primarily as a consequence of
 - the absence of clearly defined property rights

and

the way in which fishers react to the influences or incentives that they face under such conditions.

FAO, 2004

Approaches to Addressing Overcapacity

Approaches to

Addressing

Overcapacity

Reminder #1

- Sustainability
 - > a function of the willingness to uphold limits on catches
- Commercial viability
 - a function of the type of management program
- Participation
 - encouraging additional participation without disadvantaging current participants
 - inspiring participation, not circumvention whilst making circumvention / non-compliance undesirable

Approaches to
Addressing
Overcapacity

Approaches

- alter capacity
- indirectly affect capacity
- directly manage capacity

 Because there is no single solution, capacity [management] programs will likely be a combination of some of the issues and approaches that are outlined...

FAO (2002)



Altering Capacity

Closures displacement

Consolidation ———— efficiency changes

Buyouts "innovation"



Indirectly Affecting Capacity

- Limited entry programs
- Permit moratoria, license limitation programs
- Gear and vessel restrictions
- Aggregate quotas (e.g., TACs)
- Non-transferable vessel catch limits

Approaches to Addressing Overcapacity

Indirectly Affecting Canacity

—— mancotty / modifing capacity						
Management Tool	Duration	Direct Effect(s)	Longer-term Effect(s)			
gear restrictions vessel restrictions	temporary	initial reduction in harvests	 substitution of unregulated inputs or new gear types to replace restricted inputs regulations lose effectiveness and additional regulations required 			

create motives for IUU fishing

· capacity will increase • capital stuffing – where a vessel's horsepower, length, breadth, and tonnage are increased - typically occurs · drives changes (technological innovations) in gear, in fishing periods or limited entry programs limit participation temporary areas create motives for IUU fishing

capacity will increase

 capacity and effort increase if effort and entry unrestricted • race for fish ("fishing derby") develops • frequently result in excess processing capacity and processing plant aggregate quotas · likely to accelerate, not reduce, the down time during closed season(s) total allowable catches temporary growth of fishing capacity (TACs) reporting, ensure traceability and to control transshipment · create motives for IUU fishing

· capacity will increase

• potential for frequent overruns of the TAC resulting in overexploitation • additional regulations required, particularly to limit discarding and false

 requires regulations to ensure traceability and to control transshipment overcapacity not addressed non-transferable vessel · additional regulations required • may limit additional growth of catch limits (individual temporary · create motives for IUU fishing quotas / IQs) capacity · capacity will increase

Source: FAO (2004)

 purchase of vessel(s), license(s), • any improvements in stock abundance will attract additional capacity and/or gear(s) · create motives for IUU fishing buyback programs temporary

reduced in the fishery

 capacity may be temporarily · capacity will increase



Directly Affecting Capacity

Tenure Systems

- Territorial Use Rights (TURFs)
 - Marine Exploitation Areas (MEAs)
 - Beach Management Units (BMUs)
- The "Q's"
 - CDQs, CFQs, IFQs, ITQ, LAPPs, DAPPs, SFRs

Approaches to Addressing

Addressing Overcapacity Directly Affecting Canacity

transshipment

create motives for IUU fishing

•requires group understanding of asset value of user rights,

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•reduction of overcapacity or containment of capacity linked to

capacity managed automatically, overcapacity does not occur /

•compliance concerns internalized by fishers to protect asset

•supplementary regulations helpful to reinforce conservation

•administratively intensive: require constant adjustment of tax

levels to maintain capacity at desired level

•politically difficult to impose, easier to rescind

•reduction of overcapacity or capacity containment depends on

capacity will increase

capability to manage

capability to manage

recur

subsequent management

(rally against IUU fishing)

subsequent management

Management Tool	Duration	Direct Effect(s)	Longer-term Effect(s)		
individual effort quotas (IEQs) denominated in trawl time,	mid-term	•enforcement difficult	 capital stuffing – where a vessel's horsepower, length, breadth, and tonnage are increased – frequently occurs requires regulations to ensure traceability and to control 		

•additional regulations required to

•reallocation of the fishery to the

•reallocation of the fishery to the

control input substitution

recipient community

recipient community

market forces drive out

consolidation occurs if

market forces drive out

consolidation if overcapitalized

overcapacity

overcapacity

overcapitalized

potentially

enduring

potentially

enduring

gear use, time away from port, fishing days, etc.

group fishing rights

Community Development

Quotas (CDQs)

Territorial Use Rights (TURFs) Management and Exploitation Areas for Benthic Resources

(MEABRs)

Limited Access Privilege

Programs (LAPPs)

Designated Access Privilege Programs (DAPPs)

individual fishing rights (IFQs)

individual transferable quotas

(ITQs)

taxes and royalties



Directly Affecting Capacity

There is no single program of rights that can be applied to all fisheries...

... [it] will depend on the setting in which they are applied and on the design of the rights system which, in turn, hopefully reflects the objectives and goals set out for a particular fishery.

Shifting to Successful Management Regimes



Capturing the Sunken Billions

"The crisis in the world's marine fisheries is not only a fisheries problem, but one of the political economy of reform.

Experience shows that successful reforms may also require champions or crises to catalyze the process."

Capturing the Sunken Billions

- Fisheries reform will require reduction in fishing effort and fleet capacity.
- Thus, successful reforms should take the time to
 - build consensus among fisheries on the transition pathways,
 - make provisions for creating alternative economic opportunities,
 - establish social safety nets for affected fishers, and
 - generally manage transition in an equitable manner.

The Sunken Billions (2009)



Capturing the Sunken Billions

- "Successful reforms will require
- strengthening of marine tenure systems
- equitable sharing of benefits from fisheries
- curtailment of illegal fishing
- reduction or elimination of pernicious subsidies in the transition to sustainability...'

The Sunken Billions (2009)

Forging a Common Vision

Forging a Common Vision

Examples

- International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacity)
- Regional Plans of Action
 - > IATTC (2005)
 - Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (2007)
- National Plans of Action
 - Indonesia (2008), Namibia (2007), USA (2004)

Forging a Common Vision

LVFO RPOA-Capacity Action Areas

- Policy and Legal Framework
- Institutions and Institutional Processes
- Regional and International Collaboration
- Political Issues
- Stakeholder Participation
- Financing Capacity Management
- Information on Fisheries Resources

- Management of Fishing Capacity
- Species-specific capacity management measures
- Incentives in the Fishing Sector
- Socio-economic Concerns
- Human Resources Development
- Infrastructure Development
- Environmental and Ecosystem Issues
- Information Exchange and Dissemination

Forging a Common Vision

From Vision to Reality

- □ Global vision
- Strategies and implementation
 - Regional
 - National
 - Local

Thank you